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will control operatiois from a common location. The County EOC will be the command <br />and control center f~r the incident. The incident commander and his staff will operate <br />from the EOC once it is open. Operational command will be maintained at the incident <br />site. <br /> <br /> (4) There may be situations where crisis and consequence management <br />must be conducted limultaneously. It is possible that command of the scene may be <br />transferred back and ~forth between the crisis and consequence management teams before <br />the incident is brougllt to a resolution. This may be needed to meet specific requirements <br />of the response operation. <br /> <br /> (5) A/dditional command and control guidelines for county government <br />departments are defined in Annex A, Direction and Control, of the Cabarrus County <br />Emergency Operatiols Plan. <br /> <br /> f. Entry Pt_'otocols <br /> <br /> (1) A terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction will recliaire <br />new entry protocols [o ensure the safety of those responding to the incident. In terrorist <br />attacks involving bombs, the possibility for the use of a chemical or biological weapons <br />exists· The incidenl~ commander or the operational commander on the scene will <br />determine the entry 1}rotocols based on the threat level at the time of the incident. The <br />emergency services 1}ersonnel entering an area or building that may be contaminated or <br />structurally weakenetl by an explosion must be prepared for a variety of threats. This <br />entry will be coordin~_ ted with all response agencies to ensure the safety of all personnel <br />at the scene of the ~n{l~dent. <br /> <br /> (2) The new entry protocols will include the following instructions: <br /> <br />- the number and typ~ of personnel that are needed to go into the site. <br />- the personal protective equipment needed to enter the site; when and where it is needed. <br />- specific and clearly gefined hot zones, warm zones, and safe areas. <br />- indications and syn~toms of the effects of the possible weapon used. <br />- possible locations of any secondary explosive devices. <br />- any other known preblems in the target area. <br />- procedures for mai~taining the chain of custody for any evidence found. <br /> <br />g. Evidence Collection <br /> <br /> (1) In an attack involving a WMD, evidence necessary for the <br />investigation of the i~cident may be scattered over a wide area or contaminated with the <br />chemical or biological agent used in the attack. Emergency response personnel must be <br />alert to the need to preserve possible evidence and how to maintain the chain of custody <br />of this evidence in thfs environment. Although the collection of evidence is critical to the <br />investigation of the i~cident, it will not take precedence over life safety operations. The <br /> <br />EOP/ANNEX Q 7 January 2003 <br /> <br /> <br />